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 11  Naval warfare in Europe,  c . 1330– c . 1680 
 Louis  Sicking 
 Introduction 
 This chapter considers the question of how war at sea changed dur-
ing the late-medieval and early-modern periods, and whether these 
changes constitute a ‘naval  revolution’. It is now recognised by histo-
rians such as Carlo M. Cipolla, Jan Glete , John F. Guilmartin, and 
Geoffrey Parker that, during the period roughly between 1500 and 
1650, war at sea underwent a fundamental technological transform-
ation. 1 This transformation was of great importance both for warfare 
at sea and for its organisation. Thanks to the fiscal means of the mod-
ern state, permanent, professional, and complex naval organisations 
became a general phenomenon in Europe. However, at the beginning 
of the early- modern period, permanent war fleets in most cases did not 
yet represent anything more than a small core of ships, in itself of lim-
ited military importance. 2 
 All the same, many of the characteristic features of naval organ-
isation, such as arsenals, admiralties, and standing navies , had come 
into existence in the Middle Ages. Both the arsenals of Venice and 
Aragon–Catalonia dated from the beginning of the thirteenth century. 
Admiralties appeared as institutions around the office of admiral, which 
originated in Sicily in the twelfth century and became permanent there 
in 1239. In the fifteenth century Admiralty Courts appeared in Brittany , 
Normandy , and Guyenne , to mention but a few. Sicily possessed a per-
manent war fleet in the thirteenth century; Venice established one in 
 I am indebted to Jan Glete, Jaap Bruijn, Michiel de Jong, Ruthy Gertwagen, and my col-
leagues of the medieval history section at the History Department at the University of 
Leiden for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. The author is fully respon-
sible, however, for this final version and for any remaining inconsistencies. 
 1  Cipolla,  Guns ; Glete,  Navies and Nations ; Glete,  Warfare at Sea ; Guilmartin,  Gunpowder 
(citations are to the 1974 edn throughout the chapter); Guilmartin,  Galleons ; Parker, 
 Military Revolution , 82–114. 
 2  Glete,  Navies and Nations , 1, 102, 125–7, 129–31, 146. Venice represents one of the 
major exceptions: see the next paragraph. 
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1301. England may have had a permanent squadron during the reign of 
Richard I, ‘the  Lionheart’ (1189–99) but it was Henry V (1413–22) who 
actually developed something like a royal navy in the modern sense. 3 
The question is, then, to what extent a divide exists between medieval 
and early-modern European naval warfare. 
 Because most of the typical institutions of naval warfare, or naval 
organisation, originated in the Middle Ages, it seems appropriate to 
look at how technological change influenced the conduct of naval war-
fare. As the introduction of heavy guns at sea or, more specifically, the 
introduction of gun-ports happens to have taken place around the year 
1500, it will be possible to examine whether a divide exists between 
‘medieval’ and ‘early-modern’ naval warfare. This is not to imply that 
naval institutions like arsenals, admiralties, or standing navies were 
immune to change, or that they would not influence the conduct of 
warfare. It seems however that the influence of technological change on 
naval warfare is more visible and perhaps more relevant to the question 
as to whether a divide exists between medieval and early-modern naval 
warfare than the influence of organisational change. 
 Naval historiography has had a tendency to focus on major battles 
such as that of Lepanto in 1571, 4 major fleets such as the ‘Invincible 
 Armada’ of 1588, 5 or certain ships such as the  Mary Rose (built in 
1510–11, rebuilt in 1528 or 1536). The  Mary Rose was not exceptional 
but has drawn a lot of attention because of her chance survival and her 
excavation. 6 This is not only understandable because of human inter-
est in the exceptional or in the exceptional survival of evidence; it also 
reflects the fact that technological change reveals itself most clearly on 
those occasions, such as the attempted French invasion of England in 
1545, when all the stops are pulled out. 
 J. F. Guilmartin has argued that ‘changes in technology generally 
had their most significant impact upon the conduct of warfare at sea 
as a result of quantitative, not qualitative, factors’. 7 In other words, 
it is not the introduction, but the extent of the application of new 
 3  Doumerc, ‘Republic’, 153, 155; Mott, ‘Power’, 107–8; Gertwagen, ‘Contribution’, 
144; Rodger,  Safeguard , 51, 53, 116; Rose,  Warfare . 
 4  E.g. Lesure,  Lépante ; Pigaillem,  Bataille . 
 5  E.g. Martin and Parker,  Armada . 
 6  Mollat du Jourdin, ‘Mer’, 300. In recent years much of the archaeological evidence 
of the  Mary Rose has been reassessed. Conclusions have been revised often in a more 
cautious way, and so are open to more than one interpretation (e.g. Vine and Hildred, 
‘Evidence’, 15–20). The older literature on the  Mary Rose and references to it should 
therefore be used with caution: McKee,  Mary Rose ; Rule,  Mary Rose ; Loades,  Tudor 
Navy , 49–50. 
 7  Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 254. 
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technology that is decisive for the effectiveness of the changes in the 
conduct of warfare at sea. From this perspective the present paper will 
focus on the consequences of the introduction of heavy guns at sea 
and of the innovations in sailing-ship technology related to this intro-
duction.  Two important, successive changes will be considered: the 
introduction of heavy guns on galleys 8 and their introduction on sail-
ing vessels, and their respective consequences for war at sea in Europe. 
This means that the focus will be more on ships rather than on naval 
organisation. 
 Emphasis in this chapter will be put on the continued importance 
of galleys in the Mediterranean on the one hand and of merchant-
men for naval warfare in northern waters on the other. It should be 
noted that galleys also had sails to save human power whenever pos-
sible, but they were generally poor sailers unless in light breeze. 9 The 
‘return’ of the galley in north-western and northern European naval 
warfare in the sixteenth century has received relatively little atten-
tion in the existing historiography, but may be considered as one of 
the most striking features of sixteenth-century naval warfare . The 
medieval north-western European way of naval warfare – that is, 
transforming merchantmen temporarily into warships – continued to 
be common practice into the seventeenth century. It will be argued 
that the introduction of the gun-port and heavy guns on board did 
not necessarily entail the development of specialised or purpose-built 
warships. It will also be argued that improvements in sailing-ship 
technology made possible the rise of the sailing ship in naval warfare 
in the Mediterranean . 
 The introduction of heavy guns at sea and of the innovations in 
 sailing-ship technology had tremendous consequences for all European 
maritime powers, whether public or private, large or small. Space does 
not allow systematic discussion of these consequences to their full 
extent for all those involved; three important limitations have been 
made. First, references to individual powers will only be made in an 
exemplary way. If a certain prominence is given to the Low Countries 
in the selection of these references, it is merely a consequence of the 
author’s familiarity. Second, European expansion overseas will only 
be considered tangentially. 10 Finally, this chapter will focus on war-
fare at sea determined and paid for by a public authority; hence ‘naval 
   8  Gertwagen, ‘Characteristics’, 547. 
   9  Pryor,  Geography , 71–2. 
 10  This is not to deny of course the tremendous impact of gunpowder for power pro-
jection overseas. See for example Glete,  Warfare at Sea ; Trim and Fissel,  Amphibious 
Warfare . 
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warfare’, which means that privateering , filibustering, and piracy will 
largely be excluded. 11 
 This last limitation needs some further explanation, as medieval and 
early-modern naval warfare until at least 1600 – and to a great extent 
until around 1650 – was largely fought with means bought or hired from 
the market, either voluntarily or by force: that is by arrest or requisition. 
War fleets directed and paid for by public authorities consisted for the 
majority of merchant vessels that had been transformed for the occa-
sion. 12 This is not to say that kings or countries could not possess war-
ships of their own or that they could not have been built or transformed 
for war purposes only. Several countries, like France and England , did 
create permanent war fleets, although even these often consisted of 
converted merchant vessels, like the standing fleet of Emperor Charles 
V at Veere in the Netherlands between 1550 and 1561. 13 However, the 
ships making up these permanent forces represented only a minor-
ity or nucleus of the entire naval forces in wartime. Therefore public 
authorities depended for naval expeditions on the owners of merchant 
vessels. As a sea-going ship could be easily transformed into a warship – 
by putting superstructures called ‘castles’ fore and aft 14 and, after the 
introduction of the heavy gun, by temporarily adding gun-ports and 
strengthening the hull and masts 15 – merchant fleets were of great mili-
tary importance and crucial for the execution of sea power. The mer-
chant fleet of a town, a region, or a country thus represented a military 
interest of great importance. A merchant fleet had maritime or naval 
potential; indeed, it is more accurate to consider a merchant fleet in 
a military context as a versatile or flexible fleet, a multi-purpose fleet 
useful both in times of war and peace. 
 Contemporaries were very well aware of this reality. In 1522 
Margaret of Austria , regent of the Netherlands , received an instruc-
tion from Emperor Charles V that mentions the intention to make 
the Netherlandish towns equip ships ‘… to be used in war when the 
 11  In reality all kinds of mixed forms of state and non-state violence existed. Thomson, 
 Mercenaries offers an applicable theoretical framework that is useful to make at least 
some distinctions. 
 12  Hutchinson,  Ships , 149, 153; Unger, ‘Conclusion’, 257; Stradling,  Armada , 165; 
Phillips, ‘Galleon’, 104; Fritze and Krause,  Seekriege , 37–8, 54, 223. Kowaleski, 
‘Warfare’, 235 has recently argued that this could be a profitable enterprise for medi-
eval ship-owners. 
 13  Hutchinson,  Ships , 149, 153–6; Sicking,  Neptune , Chapter 6. 
 14  See for example Runyan, ‘Cog’, 47–58. 
 15  Friel,  Ship , 156; Sicking,  Neptune , 381–4. Archaeologists excavating the wreck of a 
sixteenth-century ship, possibly used for warfare, that was recently discovered at the 
bottom of the Westerschelde near Flushing, found its hull had been strengthened; 
Vos,  Standaardrapport . 
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opportunity arises; and in times of peace they will be able to serve 
the same towns to transport their merchandise …’. 16 The examples 
could be multiplied. 17 The point is clear: any study of European naval 
warfare in the medieval and early-modern periods has to take into 
account the continued importance of the merchant f leet for naval 
warfare . 
 Only by choosing a long-term approach, starting in the Middle Ages, 
is it possible to assess continuities and changes in European warfare 
at sea while gunpowder was introduced. The first explicit evidence of 
a gunpowder weapon used for the defence of ships dates from 1337, 
although many scholars believe that those weapons appeared aboard 
ships even earlier, that is shortly after they began to be used on land. 
Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the use of gunpow-
der weapons at sea increased. By 1450 they were commonplace on ships 
both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic . 18 Thus when the gun-
port was introduced by 1500, gunpowder had been used in maritime 
warfare for more than one-and-a-half centuries . The rising interest in 
medieval naval history in recent years will help to bridge the divide 
between medieval and early-modern naval history. 19 For reasons of clar-
ity the dividing line between the medieval and early-modern periods 
will be drawn in the year 1500, which is somewhat arbitrary but fits well 
with the already mentioned introduction of the gun-port, usually dated 
around that year. 20 Thus ‘medieval’ in this chapter means pre-1500 and 
‘early-modern’ indicates post-1500. 
 Rowing for war 
 Until the twelfth century, warships were mostly oared vessels both 
in northern waters and in the Mediterranean , but from then on, oars 
were gradually replaced by sails –– initially along the Atlantic coast. 21 
Galleys nevertheless remained popular as warships for a long time, not 
only in the Mediterranean. In 1120, for instance, the bishop of Santiago 
de Compostella hired a Genoese shipwright to build two bireme galleys 
for service against Muslim pirates . The galley remained the preferred 
warship in the Atlantic well into the fourteenth century, and it was the 
 16  Sicking,  Neptune , 206. 
 17  E.g. Elias,  Vlootbouw , 5. For examples from the fifteenth century, see Jongkees, 
‘Armement’, 71–87; Bakker, ‘Het bijeenbrengen’, 3–20; Sicking, ‘Les transports’. 
 18  DeVries, ‘Effectiveness’, 389–90. Compare Cipolla,  Guns , 75–6. 
 19  E.g. Rose,  Warfare ; Hattendorf and Unger,  War at Sea . 
 20  Cipolla,  Guns, 81–2. 
 21  Fernández-Armesto, ‘Warfare’, 235–6. 
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primary combat vessel in all of the naval battles fought between Castile 
and Portugal during the 1300s. 22 
 Height was a crucial factor in naval encounters. The naval experts of 
Aragon–Catalonia were well aware of this. In the late thirteenth century 
they designed galleys with particularly high forecastles and poops to 
accommodate and protect the ‘deadly accurate’ Catalan crossbowmen . 
This enabled the Catalan–Aragonese fleet to defeat the Angevin fleet, 
which used galleys with low bulwarks, in the battle of Malta (1283) dur-
ing the War of the Sicilian Vespers (1282–1302). 23 
 The introduction of the heavy gun on board: the advantage of the 
galley 
 Galleys were the first ships to take advantage of the use of heavy artil-
lery ; from the start of the sixteenth century all major galley fleets 
were so armed . Galleys mounted a single large gun forward in the 
bow of the vessel.  Originally iron breech-loaders were used, but soon 
Mediterranean galleys were armed with more formidable bronze 
 muzzle-loaders, which could fire either stone shot, or the heavier iron 
balls of 30 to 50 lb or more, with hull-smashing capacity. The Venetians 
were able to shoot at a distance of more than 450 m. By the beginning 
of the sixteenth century sliding carriages were used to absorb the shock 
of the recoil and thus to avoid damage to the hull of the ship. With the 
heavy gun the low galley could inflict serious damage on the high-sided 
hull of a large sailing ship, whereas before the higher sailing ship had 
held the advantage when attacked by galleys with infantry weapons. 
The galley was also vulnerable to gunfire, but with its low hull it was 
more difficult to hit than a high sailing ship. 24 
 The galley with a heavy gun mounted in its bow could thus fire for-
ward and be used in the standard line-abreast formation, which was 
practically the most frequently used tactic of warfare at sea as well as 
on land. The fact that only one heavy gun could be mounted in the bow 
of each galley was not an important disadvantage as long as heavy guns 
were scarce and sailing ships were unable to mount such a gun in their 
bow. 25 The only firearms that could be used from sailing ships in the 
same formation were small arms. 26 The fact that galleys, thanks to their 
 22  Mott, ‘Power’, 105–6, 111. 
 23  Hutchinson,  Ships , 147; Mott, ‘Power’, 107. 
 24  Rodger,  Safeguard , 207–8; Guilmartin,  Galleons , 114; Glete,  Warfare at Sea , 22, 
27–8. 
 25  Glete,  Warfare , 28. 
 26  Rodger,  Safeguard , 208. 
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oars, could be manoeuvred independently from the wind enabled them 
to fire with more precision than sailing ships. Unlike sixteenth-century 
sailing fleets, galleys could also manoeuvre in large formations where 
fleet and squadron commanders might exercise control and command. 
At Lepanto, the greatest naval battle of the age, more than 200 galleys 
fought on each side. Both as gun-carriers and as units of large fleets 
they were eminently suited to contemporary disciplined warfare with 
formalised tactics. 27 
 There were certainly disadvantages to galleys mounting heavy artil-
lery . They had a tendency to dig their bow into the slightest head sea, 
but shipwrights – those from the Venetian arsenal were probably the 
first – compensated for the weight of the artillery by designing hulls 
that were fuller at the bow and finer at the stern, resulting in a fish-like 
shape below the water surface. 28 They also became much heavier and 
thus needed more oarsmen. 
 But in spite of these inconveniences, from around 1500 until around 
1580 galleys had gained a major advantage relative to sailing ships. 29 
For centuries, galleys had been vulnerable to the high sides and decks 
of ships, but thanks to the heavy gun they could now stand off and 
sink them with impunity. As a result the galley gained importance for 
warfare at sea in the Mediterranean, in the waters of north-western 
Europe, and in the Baltic . In the Mediterranean there had been few 
permanent galley forces before 1500, but now the number of galleys 
increased dramatically. Thanks to the introduction of the heavy gun, 
the cannon-armed galley became the basis of a Mediterranean system 
of warfare that reached its apogee between 1520 and 1580 and was to 
dominate the middle sea until the 1630s. 30 
 Although the galleys of the Mediterranean powers varied according 
to differences in strategic goals, resource availability, organisation, and 
social structure, differences in design and construction were marginal. 
They mainly involved fighting superstructures that could be quickly 
added or removed. 31 This was not only the case for the ordinary (war) 
galleys, which by 1290 had adopted the optimal rowing system – with 
three men per bench each having an oar – that was to remain domin-
ant for two-and-a-half centuries. Next to these ordinary triremes the 
heavier merchant galley could be converted for war, thus becoming a 
 27  Glete,  Warfare , 28, 35. 
 28  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 115. 
 29  Glete,  Warfare , 27. 
 30  Rodger,  Safeguard , 208; Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 59; Guilmartin,  Galleons , 118; 
Glete,  Warfare , 27. 
 31  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 119–20. 
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 gallee grosse , or great galley. These great galleys (which were sometimes 
purpose-built for military transports) were the tactical backbone of 
late-medieval galley fleets. 32 They could ‘with astonishing agility’ be 
turned into a warship in an emergency. In this way Genoa , Venice , and 
Aragon–Catalonia were able to use their merchant fleet for military 
purposes. 33 Their flexible galley fleets had enabled both Italian city-
states to build maritime Empires stretching across the Mediterranean, 
the Black Sea , and the Sea of Azov, controlling the major sea-lanes. 
 The introduction of the heavy gun, however, reduced the import-
ance of the heavy merchant galley for war. For two centuries merchant 
galleys had been the perfect solution for the transport of high-value 
commodities and for their protection against piracy.  By 1520 the small 
fleets of four to five great galleys, which had assured the overseas trad-
ing connections of Venice, no longer offered effective protection. The 
speedy war galley had become the favourite galley for battle, and the war 
fleets of the large states in the Mediterranean – the Ottoman Empire , 
Spain , and France – outsized the small fleets of Venetian merchant gal-
leys. The first line of Venice’s trading network to feel the effects was the 
fleet trading with Romania and the Black Sea , partly as a consequence 
of the threat of Turkish guns both on the heights of the Golden Horn , 
near Constantinople , and on galleys at sea before the end of the fif-
teenth century. Fear that the English king Henry VIII might requisition 
Venetian merchant galleys to use them against France in the Channel 
contributed to the end of these ‘galleys of  Flanders’ in 1533. 34 As a con-
sequence the overseas trading network of Venice declined. 
 Both Venice and Genoa had established their maritime Empires thanks 
to their flexible fleets of convertible galleys that could be used for both 
commerce and warfare. Now they had to spend extra money for pur-
pose-built galleys, which became more and more expensive for reasons 
that will be explained below. This separation of Mars and Mercury 35 in 
the Mediterranean gave an advantage to great powers like the Ottoman 
Empire and Spain , which could eventually concentrate more purpose-
built war galleys than Genoa or Venice, although Venice showed a 
remarkable ability to enhance its fleet of war galleys. In response to rising 
sea power, mainly of the Ottoman Empire , Venice built up a reserve fleet 
rising from 50 galleys in the late fifteenth century to more than 100 after 
1540 . For the campaign of Lepanto in 1571 the Venetian arsenal turned 
 32  Ibid ., 112–13; Rodger,  Safeguard , 66. 
 33  Balard, ‘Genoese Naval Forces’, 145; Rose,  Warfare , 10–11. 
 34  Lane,  Venice: A Maritime Republic , 348–52. 
 35  This expression was used in connection with Dutch maritime commerce by Bruijn, 
‘Mars en Mercurius’. 
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out 100 galleys within two months, which represented about half of the 
Christian galley fleet. 36 
 When the merchant galley disappeared as a cargo carrier around the 
middle of the sixteenth century it was redesigned into a hybrid warship, 
the galleass, with auxiliary oars, being able to carry much more heavy 
armament fore and aft than a regular war galley. Although these vessels 
greatly impressed contemporaries they would prove to be ineffective 
against the oarless ‘ship-of-the-line’. 37 
 The return of the galley in northern waters 
 The advantage galleys acquired over sailing ships resulted in what 
could be called the export of the ‘Mediterranean system of armed con-
flict at sea’ 38 or the return of the galleys to northern waters, between 
roughly 1520 and 1580 . France and England began to use galleys and 
galleasses in the Channel, while Sweden (1540) and Denmark–Norway 
(1565) introduced galleys in the Baltic . 39 France seems to have been 
first in using war galleys with heavy centre-line bow-guns in northern 
waters. In 1513 off Brest , a French galley fleet under the command 
of Prégent de Bidoux , which had been built by the Genoese and the 
Venetians, shot its way through an English war fleet sinking one ship. 
The English, who tried to retrieve the situation with a bold attack that 
failed, were shocked by the superior firepower of the French guns – 
almost certainly bronze ‘basiliks’ – from Bidoux’s galleys. This was ‘an 
entirely new way of waging war at sea’. 40 
 From 1517, the French king Francis I (1515–47) and his succes-
sor, Henry II (1547–59), used galleys in the Channel from their newly 
built naval base, Le Havre . 41 They represented the cream of the crop 
of French naval forces along the Atlantic . Thirty-seven galleys were 
intended to play an essential role in the maritime tactics envisaged by 
France in the Channel in 1545. The French armada of 1545, the great-
est invasion force ever seen in north-western Europe until then, which 
posed the most serious threat to England since 1066, contained in add-
ition to the galley force of, according to various estimates, between 125 
and 300 sailing ships, which made it comparable in size to the Spanish 
 36  Lane,  Venice , 362–4. 
 37  Glete,  Warfare , 31; Lane,  Venice: A Maritime Republic , 357–8, 373–4; Oudendijk, 
 Ridder , 77. 
 38  Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 265. 
 39  Glete,  Warfare , 27; Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 59. 
 40  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 116 citing Rodger,  Safeguard , 170–1. 
 41  Knecht,  Renaissance Warrior , 367. On the origin of Le Havre see most recently Lardin, 
 Tradition . 
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Armada of 1588. 42  French expertise provided the way for Henry VIII 
of England to build new types of oared vessels, after he had begun 
construction of the  Galley Subtle and tried in vain to obtain ten galleys 
from Charles V . The result was the construction of galleasses, and of 
eighteen light, fast, and very manoeuvrable rowing barges that proved 
highly effective during the sea combats between the French and the 
English near the Isle of Wight in 1545. When the English admiral Lord 
Lisle met his French counterpart Claude d’Annebaut in 1546, he told 
him that England was now well equipped ‘having made 8 or 10 new 
galleasses … besides sundry light vessels, as swift with oars as their 
galleys’. 43 The French, however, were far more troublesome to England 
than the other way around. 44 
 Unlike sailing ships in this period, galleys could safely operate close 
to the coast, enabling them to disembark troops and artillery or to 
serve as floating siege batteries close to the walls of seaside fortresses 
and towns. Heavy guns could smash their thin medieval walls. 45 When 
French galleys entered the estuaries of the River Scheldt and har-
boured in the roadstead of the island of Walcheren in Zeeland – out-
port of the Antwerp metropolis – in 1546, they caused great panic 
and fear amongst the inhabitants. A year later, the coastal fortress of 
Rammekens , the first fortress built in the Netherlands with bastions , 
had been completed. French galleys, seeking to use the natural har-
bour of Walcheren only as a temporary anchorage, had caused the 
island to become the ‘bulwark of the  Netherlands’, in the words of 
contemporaries. 46 
 Other examples of serious invasion efforts – in which galley fleets were 
considered essential – include, in the Mediterranean , the Turkish cam-
paign in Apulia in 1537; and, in the Baltic , the Swedish effort in 1555 to 
take the Russian fortress of Nöteborg , on the River Neva , by an amphibi-
ous attack with a fleet of around twenty galleys and numerous other ves-
sels. 47 In 1588 Spanish commanders involved in the preparation of the 
‘Invincible  Armada’ felt they needed at least twelve galleys because of the 
 42  Mollat du Jourdin, ‘Mer’, 289; Loades,  Tudor Navy , 131. Williamson,  Channel , 175 
mentions 150 ships; Roncière,  Histoire , III, 416 mentions 150 sailing vessels and 25 
galleys. According to the eyewitness du Bellay, the French armada of 1545 included 
235 ships in total; Bellay,  Mémoires , 553. Brewer  et al .,  Letters and Papers , XX, Part I, 
lvii suggest that 300 ships, 25 galleys, and 5 galleasses were involved. 
 43  Bennell, ‘Oared Vessels’, 37. 
 44  Brewer  et al .,  Letters and Papers , XX, Part I, lx. 
 45  Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 265; Guilmartin,  Galleons , 118; Trim and Fissel,  Amphibious 
Warfare , 442–3. 
 46  Sicking,  Neptune , 303 n. 58, 304–6. 
 47  Glete, ‘Naval Power’, 226; Glete, ‘Amphibious Warfare’, 128; Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 
264. 
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amphibious nature of the operation. 48 Although none of the four galleys 
that eventually sailed with the Armada actually reached the Channel, it 
is clear that the galley gained importance in warfare at the northern seas 
during most of the sixteenth century. 
 The continued importance of galleys in the Mediterranean and 
the Baltic 
 The tactical logic of galley warfare dictated a constant increase in the 
amount of forward-firing ordnance . Flanking pieces were put along-
side the main centre-line gun. By the 1530s a second, smaller pair of 
guns was put at the bow. The weight of artillery aboard Mediterranean 
galleys grew steadily, and with it the displacement of the ships: up to 
200 tonnes for an ordinary war galley around 1550, and 300 tonnes 
around 1650. In order to keep up speed under oars, the increased 
weight entailed disproportionate numbers of additional oarsmen. 
Venetian experiments in the 1520s with a quinquereme, having five 
men and five oars to each bench, showed that a 50 per cent increase 
in displacement required a 100 per cent increase in oarsmen if speed 
was not to be compromised. In a period of rising prices and salaries it 
became more and more difficult to fulfil the growing demand of skilled 
and motivated oarsmen. This resulted in a change in the galley rowing 
system. Alongside and instead of free, professional oarsmen, slaves and 
convicts began to be used. Individual oars gave way to a single large 
oar for each bench. A single oar was less efficient than individual oars 
pulled by skilled oarsmen: four men – one skilled oarsman and three 
slaves and/or convicts to an oar – were needed to equal the speed of 
a trireme with three professional oarsmen per bench, each with an 
oar of their own. Contrary to the former free oarsmen, slaves could 
not engage in fighting. Therefore additional men were needed to fight 
and to guard the slaves under oars. Besides this reduced efficiency, 
the advantage was that only one skilled oarsman per oar was needed, 
which reduced the dependence on skilled oarsmen and enhanced the 
flexibility to add or remove oarsmen according to the tactical situ-
ation. 49 Spain, whose galleys seem to have carried a greater weight of 
ordnance than any other Mediterranean power, introduced the new 
rowing system first, in the 1550s. Venice , whose maritime artillery was 
relatively light, was the last to abandon the old system, at the end of 
 48  Martin and Parker,  Armada , 121–2. 
 49  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 120–1. For further details: Alertsz, ‘Architecture’; Bondioli, 
Burlet, and Zysberg, ‘Mechanics’. On the Venetian quinquereme, built on the initia-
tive of a professor of Greek: Lehman,  Queeste , 40–4. 
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the sixteenth century. 50 As a result of the increase in manning density 
caused by the new rowing system the strategic radius of action of gal-
leys decreased because they had to land more frequently to recharge 
water and food. 
 Galleys continued to grow larger and more powerful in the seventeenth 
century, but the number of galley fleets declined, as well as the number 
of galleys per fleet. 51 However, galleys retained their tactical utility and 
remained in use, first of all in the Mediterranean. Inspired by Colbert , 
according to whom ‘There is no power which marks better the greatness 
of a prince than that of galleys’ (1665), Louis XIV built the greatest galley 
fleet of the Mediterranean, counting 40 ships at the end of the seven-
teenth century on which 12,000 oarsmen, 3,000 officers and 4,000 sol-
diers served. Galleys played a significant role in the Venetian–Ottoman 
wars for Crete (1654–69) and the Morea (the Peloponnesus) (1694–8), 
albeit in conjunction with, and usually secondary to, sailing warships. 52 
Spain and France operated small galley squadrons in the Channel around 
1600 and at the time of Louis XIV respectively; the Dutch built some 
galleys to counter the Spanish ones. 53 When the latter were destroyed 
in 1603 they were not replaced. In the Baltic both Sweden and Russia 
used galleys in the Great Northern War of 1700–21. 54 Inspired by the 
Turks , the Russians built more than 400 galleys during the eighteenth 
century. 55 In sum, galleys remained important for warfare at sea mainly in 
the Mediterranean and in the Baltic during the early-modern era. 
 Sailing for war 
 From the twelfth century onwards, sailing vessels gradually became more 
important for warfare. Thanks to more masts and sails and the applica-
tion of rudders ‘fitted to stern-posts rising from the keel’ instead of ‘tillers 
dangled from the starboard towards the keel’, the manoeuvrability of sail-
ing vessels increased. These now became an alternative to oared vessels. 
Ships were thus freed from the economic and logistic burden of great 
numbers of oarsmen. Oar-powered vessels dominated Baltic warfare until 
1210, when the crusading order of the Sword Brothers switched to cogs. 
 50  Guilmartin,  Gunpowder , 268. 
 51  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 125, 211. 
 52  Zysberg, ‘Galères’, 123; Zysberg and Burlet,  Gloire , 82–3; Rowlands, ‘French 
Amphibious Warfare’, 265, 268, 276–7. ‘Il n’y a point de puissance qui marque mieux 
la grandeur d’un prince que celle des galères’ (Zysberg and Burlet). 
 53  Lehmann,  Galeien , 95–103. 
 54  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 212; Lehman,  Galeien . 
 55  Zysberg and Burlet,  Gloire , 127. 
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The French at the battle of Sluys in 1340 used both the royal galleys and 
170 sailing ships, of which many were certainly intended for the fray. In 
England , not until around 1400 did the fighting vanguard become almost 
entirely sail-driven, oared craft forming only a small part of its navy . 56 
 Ships that did not need to be propelled by oars could have higher 
freeboards, offering them an important advantage in a time when height 
was a crucial tactical criterion . As a result, oarless craft played a grow-
ing – albeit slowly growing – role in Mediterranean warfare too . 57 The 
raids carried out by cogs from Bayonne in the Mediterranean in 1304 
impressed the Genoese, Venetians, and Catalans who had started to 
build  coches or cogs themselves. 58 Medieval sailing ships were equipped 
with superstructures fore and aft – castles – which allowed for attacking 
the enemy. In time these castles became higher and higher, making the 
ships top-heavy and causing them to look like floating fortresses. As a 
result it was almost impossible for a galley crew successfully to board 
and enter a sailing ship. 59 The attack on the Venetian Levant convoy by 
a Genoese fleet of eighteen galleys in 1264 offers a good illustration. 
The Venetian convoy, consisting of twelve single-decked sailing vessels 
of about 150 tons’ displacement; half-a-dozen smaller craft; and a single 
large, round ship of 750 tons (the  Roccaforte ), although outnumbered by 
the Genoese, managed to resist for hours. When the Venetians finally 
retreated aboard the  Roccaforte , the Genoese were unable successfully 
to assail the vessel. 60 Almost 200 years later, in 1453 during the Turkish 
siege of Constantinople , 150 Turkish boats gathered around four sailing 
vessels in the Bosporus but were unable to capture them. By the 1420s 
the Genoese were building carracks of 600 to 900 tons’ displacement. 
Such vessels, prestige state warships, were ‘essentially immune to attack 
by galleys’. 61 In the fifteenth century the Venetian state, too, commis-
sioned large sailing warships for operations against corsair galleys. 62 
 The introduction of the heavy gun on board:  the slowly developed 
advantage of the sailing vessel. 
 From a medieval perspective, the introduction of the heavy gun at sea 
was yet another, but important, phase in the development of gunpowder 
 56  Fernández-Armesto, ‘Warfare’, 236. Rodger,  Safeguard , 473. Friel,  Ship , 147–150. 
 57  Fernández-Armesto, ‘Warfare’, 236. 
 58  Runyan, ‘Naval Power’, 60–1; Gertwagen, ‘Characteristics’, 554; Runyan, ‘Cog’, 
47–58. 
 59  Fernández-Armesto, ‘Warfare’, 236. 
 60  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 114. 
 61  Fernández-Armesto, ‘Warfare’, 236. 
 62  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 114; Lane,  Venice: A Maritime Republic , 412. 
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weapons in naval warfare . Originally used as anti-personnel weapons, 
gunpowder weapons increased in size and numbers on warships in 
the fifteenth century. Three technological innovations in the fifteenth 
century encouraged the rise of gunpowder weapons in naval warfare 
and remained of importance in the sixteenth century. The first was 
the addition of a swivel to the base of a small gun that could be used 
from the side of the hull or castle, or from the bow or stern of a galley. 
The second was the hand-held gunpowder weapon, allowing for more 
mobile gunfire, which began to be used on ships. The third was the 
large shipboard gun, which could be loaded with both the ball and the 
powder from the rear. 63 
 Whereas the first two weapons could only be directed against oppos-
ing personnel, the third allowed for larger guns with hull-smashing 
capacity to be mounted on the sides of ships.  The latter is confirmed by 
Philip of Cleves’ treatise,  Instruction de toutes manières de guerroyer tant 
par terre que par mer , which he wrote around 1516, and which is one of 
the few sixteenth-century treatises to deal with the fitting out of war-
ships in a more or less systematic way. Philip states that two cannon 
and a big culverin on wheels should be placed between the mast and the 
forecastle on each side. 64 
 The gun-port offered an alternative means to mount heavier guns as 
it enabled cannon to be placed below the deck. Ships could thus carry 
more and heavier artillery without becoming unstable. Traditionally 
dated to 1501, when a French shipwright is supposed to have invented 
the gun-port, there is evidence that gun-ports had already appeared in 
the late fifteenth century. 65 It is not well known, however, how exactly the 
broadside location of guns in the hull of sailing vessels developed. Philip 
of Cleves’ treatise explicitly refers to the use of watertight  gun-ports. 
The fact that the gun-ports needed ‘hatches that can be raised by ropes 
when necessary in order to fire the cannons’ indicates that they were 
located low down near the waterline. Philip added that these hatches 
could only be opened and the cannon behind them used if the weather 
permitted. 66 New technology is one thing; the successful application of 
it is another. This was to be dramatically illustrated thirty years later 
when the  Mary Rose , the vice-admiralship of Henry VIII , overloaded 
with men and guns, heeled over with the wind and was flooded by 
 63  DeVries, ‘Effectiveness’, 394–5; Hutchinson,  Ships , 149. 
 64  Oudendijk,  Ridder , 122. The Warwick Roll ( c . 1485) offers an example of this loca-
tion; DeVries, ‘Effectiveness’, 394. 
 65  Cipolla,  Guns , 82; Friel,  Ship , 154; Hutchinson,  Ships , 160–1; DeVries, ‘Effectiveness’, 
396. 
 66  Oudendijk,  Ridder , 122; Paviot,  Philippe , 43. 
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water entering through the lowest gun-ports, which had been left open 
after firing. 67 Clearly, in spite of all the risks that gun-ports close to the 
waterline entailed, they were considered of great importance in order to 
optimise the chance of hitting the hulls of the enemy ships. 
 The challenge sailing ships were facing was that they could not fire 
forward to the same extent as galleys. Sailing vessels could fire noth-
ing but small arms when they were attacked by a galley fleet in stand-
ard line-abreast formation. 68 A solution to this major tactical problem 
was only gradually found. Initially, there seems to have been a ten-
dency to put the heavy artillery in the aft of sailing ships. Amongst 
the above-mentioned cannon behind hatches, Philip of Cleves expli-
citly included two cannon aft, one on either side of the rudder. Philip 
goes on to mention that on the first floor of the aftercastle – that is, 
one level higher than the above-mentioned cannon behind gun-ports 
with hatches – ‘two great culverins should be put, one on either side of 
the mast, which shoot forward as they cannot be turned to be used on 
broadside because of their length’. 69 At the same level in the aftercastle 
two great cannon ( bastons ) should be placed, again one on each side of 
the rudder, to shoot from behind. Thus at least four great cannon were 
put in the aftercastle protruding from the stern of the ship. It seems that 
the largest guns were used aft originally, and the broadside guns below 
deck soon after . 70 
 As the size (and number) of gunpowder weapons on ships increased, 
it became necessary to strengthen the ship’s hull both to enable it to 
withstand the increased recoil of its own weapons and to protect it 
against hull-smashing balls from the enemy. 71 The introduction of the 
heavy gun at sea thus stimulated the development of purpose-built sail-
ing warships. King James IV of Scotland’s  Great Michael , built between 
1506 and 1512, was about 1,000 tons and revolutionary in design, as 
she was designed from the first to carry a main armament of heavy 
artillery. 72 King Hans of Denmark (1481–1513) built some of the lar-
gest warships in the world, like  Engelen ( c . 1510), whose size was prob-
ably around 1,500 to 2,000 tonnes’ displacement. 73 The English king 
Henry VIII launched his  Henry Grace à Dieu or  Great Harry , carry-
ing 186 guns, in 1514 in the presence of the court and the papal and 
 67  McKee,  Mary Rose , 65–8; Parker,  Military Revolution , 91. 
 68  Rodger, ‘Development’, 303. 
 69  Oudendijk,  Ridder , 122. 
 70  Rodger,  Safeguard , 207–9. Compare Sicking, ‘Philip’, 129. 
 71  DeVries, ‘Effectiveness’, 394–5. 
 72  Rodger,  Safeguard , 168–9. See Macdougall, ‘Greatiest scheip’ for further details. 
 73  Glete, ‘Naval Power’, 221. 
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imperial ambassadors. Francis I of France followed in 1521 with the 
 Grande Françoise . This 1,500-ton ship, equipped with a chapel, a tennis 
court, and a windmill, was ‘the most triumphant thing that any sailor 
ever saw’. 74 The Portuguese and Swedish kings respectively launched 
the  Sao João , which is said to have carried no fewer than 366 guns, in 
1534, and the  Elefanten in 1555. 75 
 ‘Great ships’ like these were but a small minority of all ships available 
for naval warfare ; they were also built as much for reasons of prestige 
and reputation as for their tactical value. They seem to have been lost 
more often through accidents, lack of money, or simple inability to sail, 
than through the effects of gunfire. The  Engelen accidentally burnt at 
Santander in 1518 after the ship had been loaned by Hans’ successor , 
Christian II , to his brother-in-law, Charles of Habsburg , to serve as 
flagship for his coronation voyage to Spain . 76 In the war of 1512–14, the 
 Great Michael was sold to France because Scoland could not afford to 
maintain such a large ship. 77 The  Grande Françoise proved to be what a 
Venetian visitor predicted: ‘so magnificent that it looks as though she 
will be incapable of putting to sea’. Her draft was so deep that she could 
not leave the harbour. 78 And as already noted, the loss of the  Mary Rose 
was due to instability, rather than to French fire. 
 These ships probably all carried heavy guns behind gun-ports. In 
order to mount as many guns as possible they were floating fortresses 
rather than manoeuvrable weapons of war. 79 However, the ability of 
ships to carry heavy guns behind gun-ports did not originate only in 
the above-mentioned ships of royal prestige. Sailing ships from Genoa 
and Lübeck , and privately owned English ships, which had been bought 
for the English navy around 1512–14, all carried heavy guns. 80 In the 
Netherlands , too, ships mounted heavy guns below deck in the 1510s 
and 1520s. 81 These examples represent different European traditions of 
the same ability to carry heavy guns. 
 New ship designs were developed to utilise heavy guns as effectively 
as galleys. One of these designs was the aforementioned galleass. The 
galleass had the bow of a galley able to mount a heavy gun, and carried 
guns on the broadside on a deck under which banks for oarsmen were 
located. Another, more frequently used ship type that developed was 
 74  Rodger,  Safeguard , 204, 547 n. 3. 
 75  Cipolla,  Guns , 82. 
 76  Glete, ‘Naval Power’, 221. 
 77  Rodger,  Safeguard , 172; Macdougall, ‘Greatiest scheip’, 56–7. 
 78  Rodger,  Safeguard , 204 (citation). Knecht,  Renaissance Warrior , 367. 
 79  Cipolla,  Guns , 83 
 80  Carr Laughton, ‘Ship-Guns’, 242–85. 
 81  Sicking, ‘Philip’. 
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the galleon, which combined the fore-part of a galley with the  after-part 
of a sailing ship. It connected the military advantage of the galley with 
the seaworthiness of sails. The importance of the galleon and its focus 
on heavy gunnery in the bow until the end of the sixteenth century are 
explained by the fact that the galley remained the galleon’s most import-
ant enemy. Although the word ‘galleon’ indicated a kind of ship, its pre-
cise meaning varied from country to country. Whereas the Portuguese 
 galeão was practically a purpose-built warship, the Spanish  galleón des-
ignated both warship and armed merchantman. 82 As the Spanish gal-
leon had to be fit for war and trade, it will be discussed in the section on 
converted merchant vessels. The events of 1588 had shown that English 
galleons had an advantage over their slower Spanish counterparts thanks 
to a distinctive design technique of ‘whole- moulding’, which produced 
fast and weatherly hulls. 83 The superiority of the English galleons con-
tinued to be acknowledged in early–seventeenth-century Spain. 84 
 The introduction of cast-iron guns around the middle of the six-
teenth century made it economically possible to arm ships on an unpre-
cedented scale, as guns of cast iron were much cheaper than bronze. At 
the same time important improvements were made in truck-carriage 
design and foundry practice. Cast-iron guns were considerably heavier 
than bronze pieces, which threw the same weight of ball, but cost only 
about a third or a quarter as much. The disparity increased in time 
until the cost of iron ordnance had fallen to an eighth of that of bronze 
in England in the 1670s. 
 A massive international trade in cast-iron guns developed, in which 
the Dutch played a particularly important role. In the words of con-
temporaries, the United Provinces became ‘the arsenal of the world’ 
thanks to the development of an important arms industry, which man-
aged to assure and regulate the supply of raw materials, like iron from 
Sweden and saltpetre from the Indies , and which produced not only for 
the Dutch market but also for export. By 1650, cast-iron ordnance had 
become the standard means of defence afloat, although bronze ord-
nance did not entirely disappear. 85 
 Thanks to broadside gun-ports and cast-iron guns a ship could carry 
far more guns. Depending on its size, the gun-armed sailing ship that 
developed in the seventeenth century had one, two, or – exceptionally – 
three complete battery decks. Besides, guns continued to be mounted 
under the quarterdeck and in the forecastle. When guns became 
 82  Guilmartin, Galleons, 158–9; Phillips, ‘Galleon’, 103; Domingues, ‘Forces’, 195. 
 83  Rodger,  Safeguard , 212–13, 217–20; Phillips, ‘Galleon’, 104, 106. 
 84  Martin and Parker,  Armada , 11–12; Goodman,  Spanish Naval Power , 114. 
 85  Guilmartin, ‘Guns’, 149–50; De Jong,  ‘Staat’ . 
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cheaper, gun-ports were placed closer to each other so that even more 
artillery could be mounted on sailing ships. This stimulated the trend 
towards big and heavy ships. 
 At the same time initiatives were taken to build faster and more 
manoeuvrable ships. In Portugal , the caravel of between 150 and 180 
tons with two covered decks, four masts, and narrow hull (to be distin-
guished from its smaller namesake, which had been used for discoveries 
in the fifteenth century), was probably mainly developed for naval pur-
poses in the sixteenth century. 86 In England in the 1570s the so-called 
‘race-built’ ship was introduced. This new design involved a reduction 
in the castles, sleeker lines, and a longer gun-deck. The reduction of the 
castles meant that less priority was given to optimising the use of anti-
personnel weapons, the majority of which were traditionally used from 
these castles. The sleeker lines led to a faster and more manoeuvrable 
ship, whereas the longer gun-deck permitted an increase in the weight 
of the guns’ broadside. Several English warships were built and rebuilt 
according to this race-built design. 87 
 Developments in Flanders around 1600 led to a ship design that 
was to have a broader and longer-lasting influence on European war-
ships: the frigate. Although the origins of this ship design are still being 
debated, it combined speed and manoeuvrability with hitting power 
thanks to a fine, shallow hull and a great spread of sail. Frigates had a 
low and almost even outline, into which the former castles had more or 
less been integrated; continuous decks allowed the placing of most guns 
amidships. 88 They were faster than any English ship and could ‘[run] 
rings round them’, as English captains reported in the 1620s. 89 It has 
been suggested that the Flemish frigate represented ‘the first generation 
of specialist fighting-ships in the West outside the  Mediterranean’. 90 
In the 1620s the Dutch also started to build and use frigates against 
their opponents. 91 England, and from the 1660s France too, used these 
mobile, purpose-built warships. Typically the shift that entailed the 
introduction of frigates was indicated in France as a shift in the war-
ship from a  forteresse 8 ottante to a  forteresse mobile . 92 
 The development of ship design, concentrating on the strength of 
the hull, speed, and manoeuvrability, contributed to several ship types 
or, more precisely, broad categories of ship: a clear indication that 
 86  Domingues, ‘Forces’, 194–5. 
 87  Parker, ‘Dreadnought Revolution’, 270–2, 281. 
 88  Stradling,  Armada , 165–9. 
 89  Rodger,  Safeguard , 390. 
 90  Stradling,  Armada , 168. 
 91  Bruijn,  Verleden , 82–3. 
 92  Parker,  Military Revolution , 100, 102, 215. 
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 early-modern European states were keen on optimising the effective 
use of the heavy gun at sea on sailing vessels in order to withstand 
and surpass the galley, which had originally held the advantage. The 
purpose-built sailing warship was developed along various lines and 
forms; its design and specification differed ‘from country to country, 
from shipyard to shipyard and even from ship to ship’. 93 Moreover, it 
should not be forgotten that, simultaneously with the introduction of 
heavy guns with hull-smashing capacity, boarding remained an import-
ant tactic in maritime warfare well into the seventeenth century. As 
a consequence, ships with both a fore- and aftercastle, and equipped 
with anti-personnel weapons and anti-boarding netting, continued to 
be much desired. 94 
 The return of the sailing vessel in the Mediterranean 
 Perhaps the most spectacular consequence of the slow and difficult but 
eventually successful adoption of broadside artillery on sailing ships 
was the return of the sailing vessel for warfare in the  galley-dominated 
Mediterranean. Venice well represents this development. In 1499 the 
government-owned war fleet of Venice, which was maintained by the 
state in times of peace, had included a few very large sailing ships 
designed for war by shipwrights of the Venetian arsenal. But in the 
sixteenth century the building of such vessels had stopped;  the arsenal 
then built only galleys. Next to its own galleys the Venetians also hired 
converted merchantmen. In 1618 they hired them for the first time 
from the Dutch and the English, who since the end of the sixteenth 
century had entered the Mediterranean for commercial ends. 95 It soon 
became routine for both Venice and the Ottoman Empire to lease 
Dutch and English ships for their wars – a clear indication that these 
ships were now considered sufficiently effective for warfare next to gal-
leys in the Mediterranean. In 1667 the Venetian arsenal built its first 
ship-of-the-line using an English warship as a model . During the next 
fifty years, sixty-eight ships-of-the-line issued from the arsenal. Even 
so, the republic’s Captain General of the Sea was still obliged to use a 
galley for his flagship as late as 1695, when the Turkish admiral used a 
ship-of-the-line. 96 
 93  Stradling,  Armada , 164. 
 94  Glete,  Warfare at Sea , 30; Friel,  Ship , 150, 156. 
 95  Bruijn,  Verleden , 31; Geyl,  Christofforo , 224–69. On the Dutch and English presence 
in the Mediterranean see Braudel,  Méditerranée , II, 315–20, 325–9, 341, and more 
recently for the Netherlands, Engels,  Merchants . 
 96  Lane,  Venice: A Maritime Republic , 412, 414. 
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 The continued importance of 8 exible 8 eets of merchantmen 
converted for war 
 In spite of the development of purpose-built sailing warships, the  practice 
of converting merchant vessels for war, which had been an  important 
 characteristic of medieval naval warfare , remained important until around 
the middle of the seventeenth century. 97 The introduction of the heavy 
gun at sea did not end the phenomenon of the flexible fleet in the case of 
sailing vessels as it had in the case of galleys. On the contrary, the develop-
ment of the sailing ship from the full-rigged ship of the fifteenth century – 
the three-master, which combined the Atlantic and northern square sail 
with the triangular lateen sail of the Mediterranean – to the ‘relatively 
homogeneous type of seventeenth century sailing gun-armed ship’, gave 
new opportunities for combinations of cargo-carrying and fighting pow-
er. 98 The maritime potential of Spain and the Netherlands was a major 
tool for naval warfare to these powers. 
 Spain had to support large galley fleets to counter Turkish incursions 
in the western Mediterranean from 1479 – when Castile and Aragon 
were joined in a personal union under Ferdinand and Isabella – until 
the truce with the Ottoman Empire in 1580 . However, while these fleets 
absorbed the bulk of Spanish funds for naval warfare, Spain continued 
to lease armed merchantmen for the protection of the New World trade 
and for naval operations against French and English privateers in the 
Caribbean . Because it was in the government’s interest that merchant 
ships be suitable for naval warfare, it tried to influence the merchant 
community to build larger ships by giving loading preferences at ports 
to larger ships from 1511, and by direct royal subsidies from the 1560s. 
The merchant community, however, preferred smaller vessels, because 
they were easier to unload and they handled better in the shoal waters 
of the Netherlands and the North Sea . 99 
 After the truce with the Sublime Porte in 1580 the Spanish monarchy 
could invest more money in building galleons suitable for Atlantic naval 
warfare . The reforms of Philip II after the disaster with the Armada of 
1588 were designed to standardise the construction of galleons to ensure 
that they could serve for war at sea. The result was a revitalised fleet 
consisting of huge galleons in the beginning of the seventeenth century. 
 97  E.g. Stradling,  Armada , 165; Fritze and Krause,  Seekriege , 54. It is revealing in this 
connection that in the late Middle Ages the French word  naveye referred to a body of 
ships. Depending on the context it might mean the whole merchant fleet of a country; 
Rodger,  Safeguard , 117. 
 98  For a description of this development see Glete,  Warfare at Sea , 28–31. 
 99  Mott, ‘Power’, 111–14, 117. Phillips, ‘Galleon’, 104. 
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Until the 1630s it was a formidable force that repelled, for instance, 
an attack on Cadiz by a combined Anglo-Dutch fleet in 1625. 100 Yet 
these ships still had to be fit for trade as well. In 1601 King Philip III 
gave instructions to his superintendent of construction to build ships 
 ‘suitable for both commerce and the  armada’. 101 A certain amount of 
speed and agility continued to be sacrificed for carrying capacity to 
meet the needs of the Spanish Empire for multi-purpose vessels. 
 Like Spain, the Habsburg Netherlands also continued the medieval 
tradition of providing war fleets by using merchantmen. This tradition 
remained common practice during the Habsburg–Valois wars, fought 
between 1521 and 1559. The placing of heavy artillery on board began 
to determine the choice of the ships as well as the way in which they 
were rebuilt. Hired merchant ships were modified to make them fit for 
war: gun-ports were added, the castles were modified, the hulls were 
strengthened as well as the masts to enable ships to use more sail. A 
comparison between Spanish and Netherlandish ships by a contempor-
ary witness writing in 1552 reveals the emphasis put on the ability to 
carry heavy artillery: ‘The ships from here [i.e. the Netherlands ], espe-
cially the hulks, are sturdier and can carry larger and heavier artillery 
than the Spanish ones.’ 102 Several initiatives were taken in the Dutch 
republic to develop new ship types suitable for naval warfare in the 
shoal-filled home waters – essential during the Dutch Revolt – as well 
as for the open sea, which resulted in a nucleus of specialised warships 
around 1621; 103 the majority of ships in Dutch war fleets continued to 
be transformed merchant vessels until shortly after the middle of the 
seventeenth century. 104 
 In 1536 the States of Holland claimed explicitly that it was thanks to 
the large merchant fleet of Holland that Emperor Charles V had more 
ships than the kings of Portugal , France , and England put together. 105 
 Holland’s fleet expanded rapidly in the remainder of the sixteenth cen-
tury to become the largest merchant fleet in Europe and possibly in the 
world in the seventeenth century, surpassing that of Spain. Thanks to 
this enormous ‘naval potential’ and to the establishment of an inland 
arms industry, the Dutch were not only able to equip war fleets for the 
defence of their territory, their maritime commerce, and their fisheries 
 100  Phillips, ‘Galleon’, 104; Mott, ‘Power’, 114–15. 
 101  Goodman,  Spanish Naval Power , 115. 
 102  Sicking, ‘Naval Power’, 203. For more details see Sicking,  Neptune , 370–3, 378–81; 
citation on p. 379. 
 103  Jong,  ‘Staat’ , 64–70. 
 104  Bruijn, ‘Mars en Mercurius’, 97–106; Bruijn,  Verleden , 97; Snapper,  Oorlogsin-
vloeden , 38. 
 105  Sicking,  Neptune , 359–60. 
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in Europe, but also to effect overseas expansion despite having to com-
pete with larger powers such as Spain, England , and France . Besides 
this, the Dutch potential for turning merchant ships into warships had 
not reached its limits, for it was not only used for Dutch naval warfare 
but also for the naval warfare of foreign powers. Between the 1610s and 
the 1660s the Dutch and the English hired out armed merchantmen 
with guns and crews to Venice , France , Portugal , Denmark–Norway , 
and Sweden . This happened mostly in periods of war when it was cru-
cial to mobilise as much naval power as possible. Thus, converted mer-
chantmen continued to be of importance for these states. They were 
often used as a temporary extra force in combination with permanent 
navies . 106 
 From a Dutch perspective the first half of the seventeenth cen-
tury seems to have been the apogee of the converted merchantman 
for naval warfare. The Admiralties sold many of their purpose-built 
 ‘frigate-styled’ warships during the peace negotiations with Spain in 
the 1640s. It is revealing in this connection that a plan developed by 
the Dutch admiral Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp in 1648, to build a 
strong war fleet to be maintained in peacetime, came to nothing. It was 
thought that in case of need the Dutch republic could always fall back 
on the old practice of hiring armed merchantmen. 107 
 As England lacked any major long-distance trade in the sixteenth 
century, 108 the country could not rely on merchantmen for war at sea to 
the same extent as Spain and the Netherlands , but this rapidly changed 
in the first half of the seventeenth century when both the English and 
Dutch navies ‘were run by merchants, for merchants, and largely made 
up of armed merchant ships’. 109 Denmark–Norway and Sweden did not 
have a large merchant marine. 110 Nevertheless, both  Scandinavian coun-
tries gave customs preferences to armed merchantmen in order to create 
reserve fleets that might augment the permanent navy in time of war. 111 
 In sum, European governments generally tried to use the merchant 
fleets of their own citizens or, if possible, of others, for war at sea and 
to enhance their effect to that end. 112 Sailing merchant vessels armed 
 106  Glete,  Warfare at Sea , 31; Bruijn,  Verleden , 31. 
 107  Bruijn,  Verleden , 83–4. 
 108  ‘Lacking any major long-distance trade, the English had no need of the carrying 
capacity the Spanish needed, and could afford to sacrifice it to make a more effect-
ive, more specialized man-of-war.’ England ‘came late to oceanic voyaging, late to 
gunfounding, and late to carrying heavy guns at sea’. Rodger,  Safeguard , 220. 
 109  Rodger,  Command , 12. 
 110  Guilmartin,  Galleon s, 100. 
 111  Glete,  Warfare , 31–2. 
 112  Phillips, ‘Galleon’, 104. 
9780521886284c11_p236-263.indd   257 10/13/2009   5:02:49 PM
Louis Sicking258
for the occasion remained, in numbers at least, of prime importance – 
along with the introduction of the heavy gun at sea – for naval war-
fare in Europe, as soon as the sailing vessel was capable of fighting the 
gun-armed galley . Like their purpose-built counterparts, armed mer-
chantmen carried more and more heavy guns. As long as specialised or 
purpose-built sailing warships represented a minority within the naval 
forces of a state, the size of a state’s merchant fleet, or its ability to hire 
or capture those fleets from others, remained of crucial importance for 
its sea power. Even when purpose-built warships came to dominate the 
naval forces of the European powers in the seventeenth century, mer-
chant ships continued to be of military importance, albeit in an auxil-
iary and diminishing way. 
 The adoption of the line-ahead:  a tactical revolution? 
 The flexible use of sailing merchantmen for war was gradually reduced, 
as it became clear around 1650 that merchantmen were no longer fit 
to fight wars.  The three Anglo-Dutch wars (1652–4, 1665–7, 1672–4) 
induced its participants to naval reorganisations. These resulted in the 
universal application of the most effective use of the heavy gun at sea, 
thanks to continuous broadsides fired from ships-of-the-line formed in 
line-ahead. 113 This tactic was the best practical solution to the problem 
that the ship-of-the-line moved along one axis captive to the wind, but 
discharged its cannon along another. Its adoption has been called a 
‘Military Revolution afloat’. 114 The line-ahead formation was, however, 
neither sudden nor systematically adopted by the European maritime 
powers. Boarding and entering were the tactics of preference, and the 
line-ahead was considered a defensive expedient until halfway through 
the first Anglo-Dutch war. 115 Moreover, the adoption of the line-ahead 
did not exclude converted merchantmen from war fleets, at least not 
immediately. 
 This became apparent when the Dutch were probably the first to 
apply line-ahead tactics against the Spanish at the Downs off the English 
coast in 1639. The Dutch admiral Tromp led his squadron, consisting 
of purpose-built warships and converted merchantmen, in amongst the 
Spaniards (despite the presence of the English fleet, trying to keep the 
combatants apart) and sank forty of their fifty-three ships, which were 
mostly galleons and merchant vessels. Tromp had used the formation, 
 113  Glete,  Warfare at Sea , 39. 
 114  Palmer, ‘Revolution’, 123–49. 
 115  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 210. 
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however, in a defensive way in difficult circumstances. For the  coup de 
grâce he used fire ships and mêlée tactics: that is, fighting ship against 
ship. In 1645, when a Dutch squadron closed in on the Portuguese off 
the coast of Brazil , they chose a line of battle combining warships and 
converted merchantmen. 116 
 The English were the first to adopt the line-ahead tactics  more system-
atically during the first Anglo-Dutch war. Thanks to a successful adop-
tion of line-ahead, the English, with 100 ships, defeated the Dutch, 
with about the same number under the command of Admiral Tromp , 
who stuck to the traditional boarding tactics. Off Gabbard Shoal at the 
mouth of the Thames in June 1653 the English sank twenty Dutch ships. 
The result was disastrous for the Dutch republic , as the barely damaged 
English fleet blockaded the coasts of Holland and Zeeland within a 
week. On 10 August at the battle of Ter Heide , in which Tromp was 
killed, the English sank another thirty Dutch warships. They were vic-
torious thanks to their successful adoption of the line-ahead formation, 
which had made the fighting power of their fleet more effective. 117 
 The first lesson the Dutch learned from their defeats was the inef-
fectiveness not of their tactics, but of their ships. They now realised 
that they could no longer continue to fight wars at sea with converted 
merchantmen. The result was that before the war was over two building 
programmes were launched for sixty purpose-built warships in total. In 
January 1654 the States-General took the unprecedented decision that 
none of these new warships were to be sold ‘without unanimous con-
sent’ of the United Provinces . 118 Merchant vessels were no longer rented 
from private ship-owners; Mars and Mercury were separated. The 
merchant fleet now practically lost its military importance, although 
the Dutch East India Company (VOC)  would for one last time deliver 
ships for the Dutch naval forces during the second Anglo-Dutch war. 
The possibility of using merchantmen as a flexible force in warfare at 
sea was gone, in European waters at least. 119 
 It was not until after the first naval encounter of the second Anglo-
Dutch war, off Lowestoft on 2 June 1665, that the Dutch embraced 
line-ahead and the three-squadron order, albeit in a somewhat modified 
 116  Boer,  Tromp , 2, 72, 75, 91–2, 132; Rodger,  Command , 13; Parker,  Military Revolution , 
100–1. The painting of Willem van de Velde the Elder on p. 101 is revealing. See also 
Braunius, ‘Oorlogsvaart’, 330; Guilmartin,  Galleons , 199, 203. 
 117  Bruijn,  Verleden , 94; Palmer, ‘Revolution’, 134–5, 143 where the battle indicated as 
the battle of Scheveningen and is dated, according to the English (Julian) calendar, 
on 31 July. Rodger,  Command , 17–18. 
 118  Quoted in Bruijn,  Verleden , 97. 
 119  See Bruijn,  Verleden , 97; Enthoven, ‘Mars en Mercurius’, 40; Snapper,  Oorlogsinvloeden , 
114; Nurmohamed, ‘VOC’. 
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form. At Lowestoft the Dutch lost 32 of 100 ships but their tactics 
were partially linear; they still had not fully embraced the line-ahead 
formation. The new tactics were issued by Johan de Witt in August 
1665. During the third Anglo-Dutch war, when both sides used line-
ahead tactics, the more numerous Anglo-French fleet proved unable to 
achieve major successes against the Dutch. 120 
 The great nineteenth-century naval historian Julian Corbett charac-
terised the tactical orders issued by the English in 1653 as ‘nothing less 
than revolutionary’. 121 If that is correct, and if the Dutch (and the French) 
were slow to follow, then it must be borne in mind that the English had 
also been slow to adopt the tactics that dependence on broadsides logic-
ally entailed – the larger English warships, in particular, had been func-
tionally ships-of-the-line from the 1630s onwards. 122 In comparison, the 
successive formation of a standing fleet of purpose-built warships by the 
Dutch in 1654, and their adoption of line-ahead tactics in 1665, seems 
to be a process as gradual as the English creation of a fleet of ships-of-
the-line, and its adoption of the line-ahead tactics. 
 Although eventually line-ahead tactics would be most effectively 
executed by purpose-built ships-of-the-line, this was not the result of 
a sudden introduction but of a gradual process. Not only the Dutch 
example illustrates this. In fact, the English, having adopted line-ahead 
tactics during the first Anglo-Dutch war, were using converted mer-
chantmen during the second Anglo-Dutch war in 1665, more than a 
decade after the Dutch had decided to build a major standing navy . 123 
 As line-ahead tactics remained a central element in the operations 
of European navies for a period of almost 150 years – that is, until the 
Industrial Revolution and the development of steam-driven ships with 
turreted guns – they can be considered as the last of a series of major 
changes in  European naval warfare. Perhaps because they represented 
a last major change in warfare at sea, and because they occurred at 
the same time as linear tactics were adopted on land, line-ahead tac-
tics have been accorded a prominent status in representing the ‘naval 
dimension’ of the  military revolution. 124 
 120  Palmer, ‘Revolution’, 139, 146. 
 121  Corbett cited in Harding,  Evolution , 75. 
 122  Guilmartin,  Galleons , 210. 
 123  Palmer, ‘Revolution’, 128, 138; Rodger,  Command , 69. 
 124  Palmer, ‘Revolution’, 128, 145, 148–9. 
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 Conclusion 
 The introduction of gunpowder weapons at sea, the full-rigged ship, the 
heavy gun, the galley mounting a heavy gun in its prow, the gun-port, 
the galleon combining the prow of a galley with the sailing  capacities 
of the full-rigged ship, the cast-iron gun, the broadside placement 
of guns, the frigate , the ship-of-the-line, and finally the adoption of 
line-ahead tactics – all represent important technological and tactical 
changes. Most of these changes have been designated as revolutions 
in their own right. 125 Their adoption occurred in a period ranging 
from the 1330s to the 1660s. None of these technological changes was 
adopted immediately or systematically across Europe. Their adoption 
depended generally on pragmatic considerations by different powers 
with different interests in different areas in different periods of time. 
This resulted in these technological changes being combined in a wide 
range of ways, which allowed for several continuities, bridging the div-
ide that humanists – and historians following in their wake ever since – 
have constructed between the Middle Ages and the early-modern era. 
These include the continued importance of war galleys, armed mer-
chantmen temporarily converted for war, and the traditional tactics of 
boarding and entering. It also allowed for ‘reappearances’, such as the 
return of the galley for war in northern waters and the return of the 
sailing vessel for war in the Mediterranean. 
 This wide variety of continuity and change related to naval warfare 
has influenced the different destinies of Europe’s maritime powers. It is 
impossible to analyse this complex process in its entirety here but some 
remarks can nevertheless be made. First, the slow adoption of the heavy 
gun at sea should be emphasised again. If the years around 1500 can be 
considered as a turning point in this perspective, with galleys mounting 
a heavy gun in their bow and with the introduction of the gun-port, it 
had taken more than one-and-a-half centuries since gunpowder weap-
onry had first been used afloat. 
 Second, it took another one-and-a-half centuries for permanent navies 
consisting of purpose-built warships entirely to dominate European 
naval warfare. In spite of what has sometimes been suggested by schol-
ars, the introduction of the heavy gun aboard ships did not immedi-
ately necessitate new types of purpose-built warships. On the contrary, 
the medieval warship  par excellence – the galley – reached its apogee in 
the Mediterranean in the early-modern era. Equally, the sailing mer-
chant vessel remained important for naval warfare . In the short run, the 
 125  E.g. Guilmartin, ‘Revolution’. 
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sailing vessel temporarily declined in military importance; the effective 
application of the heavy gun aboard sailing vessels, including the devel-
opment of the optimal tactics for broadside gunnery, took much longer 
than the effective application of the heavy gun aboard galleys. In the 
long run, however, the sailing merchant vessel regained the precedence 
it had temporarily lost to galleys to become an important instrument in 
the execution of the naval policies of states until around 1650. 
 The sailing merchant vessel kept its military importance much longer 
than the merchant galley. When the war galley began to dominate 
Mediterranean warfare at sea around 1520, the merchant galley, which 
for over two centuries had served to create and maintain the sea lines of 
the overseas Empires of Genoa and Venice , survived for a few more dec-
ades in the military role, but only in the redesigned form of the galleass 
with its formidable armament. The fact that the war galley superseded 
the merchant galley in the Mediterranean in its original, flexible form, 
which had made it useful for both commerce and warfare, represented 
a first separation between Mars and Mercury, which presaged the end 
of the overseas Empires of Genoa and Venice . 
 The  return of the galley in northern waters, in which France went 
ahead spectacularly in 1513, was, with hindsight, short-lived, except in 
the Baltic ; but it was impressive, not least in the eyes of contemporary 
eyewitnesses. During the short period that galleys and galleasses were 
considered advantageous for warfare in northern European waters, 
they never constituted the bulk of war fleets. As a result, they could not 
have the same impact upon the conduct of northern maritime warfare 
as upon the conduct of Mediterranean maritime warfare. 
 The adoption of broadside gunnery by sailing vessels eventually made 
possible the  return of the sailing vessel for war in the Mediterranean. 
Venice showed that it could effectively operate against the Turks when 
it enhanced its galley fleet with hired merchantmen converted for war 
during the first two-thirds of the seventeenth century, and subsequently 
by building ships-of-the line. 
 The continued (on the Atlantic side) or renewed (in the Mediterranean) 
use of transformed merchant vessels for war was not a simple sign of con-
servatism; rather, many simply continued to consider it as the optimal 
combination of effectiveness and cost-efficiency for power-projection at 
sea. The Dutch pushed the cost-efficient use of flexible merchant fleets 
to the ultimate limits of military effectiveness in an era when the English 
were to teach them the tough lesson that the future of naval warfare would 
be determined by purpose-built ships-of-the-line – more expensive than 
converted merchantmen, but more effective. The first Anglo-Dutch war 
announced a second separation of Mars and Mercury, although even 
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during the next Anglo-Dutch war Indiamen and armed merchantmen 
still represented a minority of the Dutch and English fleets respectively. 
By then money, in the form of state fiscal means, and not technology 
became the critical element of change in European naval warfare. 
 It thus took a long time before expensive permanent navies consisting 
of purpose-built warships entirely replaced the cost-efficient flexible 
fleets. One of the implications of this conclusion is that the tendency of 
some early-modern naval historians to measure naval power by count-
ing purpose-built warships does not make much sense before  c . 1650 
if they do not include merchant fleets in their calculations. 126 Another 
implication is that continuities – such as the Dutch and English use 
of merchant ships, and the Venetian and Turkish use of galleys – in 
European warfare at sea in the seventeenth century should not too eas-
ily be overlooked, or dismissed as historical anomalies. In warfare at sea 
in the period from 1330 to 1660 there is as much continuity as there is 
change. 
 When one contrasts the European navies of the late seventeenth cen-
tury with those of the fourteenth century there are very great differ-
ences. These were, however, the product of many bigger and smaller 
changes that took place next to and in interaction with existing con-
tinuities. In light of the duration of more than three centuries between 
the appearance of gunpowder weapons at sea and the domination of 
warfare at sea by permanent navies of purpose-built warships, it seems 
more accurate to speak of a naval transformation, rather than a ‘naval 
 revolution’ or ‘military revolution afloat’. 
 
 126  See for instance Modelski and Thompson,  Seapower ; and Glete,  Navies and Nations . 
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